MXL
MaxLinear, Inc.
AI Foundry & Connectivity · Optical DSP
$79.23
Mkt Cap ~$7.09B 4
52W: $11.63 – $106.28
Next earnings: 22 Jul 2026 (Q2) 4
👁 WATCH
Entry zone: $45 – $58
The market prices MXL as a broadband-semi trough recovery with a late-cycle optical kicker; the underappreciated dynamic is that Keystone's multi-hyperscaler design-win incumbency at 400G/800G creates two to three upgrade cycles of ASP-accretive incumbency before Rushmore (1.6T PAM4) even enters meaningful revenue — if Rushmore clears Tier 1 hyperscaler qualification in H2 2026, consensus FY26 revenue becomes the floor, not the midpoint, for FY27. At $79, this optionality is fully priced in and then some.
Fwd P/E (NTM)
53×
PEG 0.61 (g=89% EPS 3Y) ⚠
vs prior profitable periods 21–39×Above High
vs prior profitable periods 21–39×Above High
Rev YoY (Q1 2026)
+43%
QoQ +1% → guide +20% QoQ in Q2 1
Gross Margin (GAAP)
57.5%
Non-GAAP 59.5% · trend ↑ from ~52% trough 1
FCF Margin (TTM)
2.0% ⚠
$10.15M TTM · Q1 FCF −$11.1M (wafer prepayments) 1,4
EPS Revision (90d)
↑ net ⚠
11 analysts · FY26E non-GAAP EPS $1.34 · avg PT $68.36 4
Next Earnings
22 Jul
Q2 2026 · Confirmed 4
Infra Rev %
45.8%
$62.8M Q1 · +136% YoY · +35% QoQ 1
DC Rev YoY
+136%
Optical data center · mgmt guides $160M FY26 1,2
Thesis Durability
B+
Variant perception: Keystone's multi-hyperscaler incumbency at 400G/800G is under-appreciated as a structural moat, not a cyclical recovery. Design wins are sticky — hyperscalers qualify once and run for 2–3 product generations. MXL's $62.8M infra revenue (+136% YoY in Q1 2026) and management's 40%+ upward revision to FY26 optical guidance ($160M midpoint vs. prior $115M) reflect confirmed design-win pull, not hopeful forecasting.1,2
Rushmore 1.6T option value: Rushmore (200G/lane PAM4 DSP, targeting 1.6T transceivers) samples H2 2026, revenue in 2027. Annapurna (224G scale-up retimer) adds a second 1.6T content vector for co-packaged optics architectures. Combined, they offer a potential 2–3× ASP uplift per transceiver vs. current 400G/800G products.2
Competitive risk at 1.6T: Marvell's Taurus DSP operates at 400G/lane (native 1.6T single-chip) vs. MXL's Rushmore at 200G/lane (two-DSP configuration). If hyperscalers prefer lower chip-count integration, Taurus offers a simpler bill-of-materials. Broadcom also has DSP capability. Rushmore's competitive position is unproven at Tier 1 qualification scale.3
Non-infra drag: Broadband ($43.6M, 32%), Connectivity ($18.6M, 14%), and Industrial ($12.2M, 9%) are structurally flat or declining. These segments represent ~54% of Q1 revenue. Infra must grow to 65%+ mix before company-level operating leverage becomes structurally compelling.1
Cyclicality check: not triggered — optical DSP is a design-win-driven market, not commodity inventory-cycle. Non-infra segments (broadband, industrial) have cyclical characteristics but are now small relative to the growth driver.
Rushmore 1.6T option value: Rushmore (200G/lane PAM4 DSP, targeting 1.6T transceivers) samples H2 2026, revenue in 2027. Annapurna (224G scale-up retimer) adds a second 1.6T content vector for co-packaged optics architectures. Combined, they offer a potential 2–3× ASP uplift per transceiver vs. current 400G/800G products.2
Competitive risk at 1.6T: Marvell's Taurus DSP operates at 400G/lane (native 1.6T single-chip) vs. MXL's Rushmore at 200G/lane (two-DSP configuration). If hyperscalers prefer lower chip-count integration, Taurus offers a simpler bill-of-materials. Broadcom also has DSP capability. Rushmore's competitive position is unproven at Tier 1 qualification scale.3
Non-infra drag: Broadband ($43.6M, 32%), Connectivity ($18.6M, 14%), and Industrial ($12.2M, 9%) are structurally flat or declining. These segments represent ~54% of Q1 revenue. Infra must grow to 65%+ mix before company-level operating leverage becomes structurally compelling.1
Cyclicality check: not triggered — optical DSP is a design-win-driven market, not commodity inventory-cycle. Non-infra segments (broadband, industrial) have cyclical characteristics but are now small relative to the growth driver.
Real variant perception, proven incumbency — but Rushmore competitive position vs Marvell Taurus is the key unresolved question for the next cycle.
Business Quality
C+
P&L trajectory: Q1 2026 GAAP op margin −12.5%, non-GAAP +15.9%. Q2 2026 guidance implies GAAP operating profit of ~+0.5% — the first positive GAAP operating quarter in three years.1 The GAAP/non-GAAP spread is wide and persistent: ~$80M/yr in SBC is the dominant wedge. Piotroski F-score: 5/9 (moderate quality, improving trajectory).4
FCF quality: TTM FCF $10.15M (2.0% margin) is near zero on an economic basis. Q1 FCF was −$11.1M due to wafer prepayments — a demand signal, not a distress signal, but SBC-adjusted GAAP FCF remains close to zero even as non-GAAP FCF trajectory improves.1,4
Superinvestor: No tracked Dataroma superinvestor position change exceeding 25% in the most recent 13F filing. Note: 13F data carries a 45-day lag.6
FCF quality: TTM FCF $10.15M (2.0% margin) is near zero on an economic basis. Q1 FCF was −$11.1M due to wafer prepayments — a demand signal, not a distress signal, but SBC-adjusted GAAP FCF remains close to zero even as non-GAAP FCF trajectory improves.1,4
🟡 Solvency Screen: INVESTIGATE
Triggered: GAAP losses, pre-profitability, thin FCF, net debt position.
Top risks: (1) If infra revenue stalls, MXL returns to negative FCF with $90M net debt and limited cash cushion — revolver draw probable. (2) SBC ~$80M/yr means economic GAAP FCF is near zero even as non-GAAP FCF improves; ongoing equity dilution ~1–2%/yr compounds. (3) No covenant headroom disclosure in Q1 10-Q; any covenant breach on revolver is a liquidity event risk.
Top stabilisers: (1) Revolver extended to March 2028 — management has runway to let infra compound without a refinancing cliff. (2) Wafer prepayments ($11M Q1 working capital drag) reflect hyperscaler demand pull and are expected to reverse in H2 2026. Non-GAAP FCF trajectory to $120M+ FY26E reduces net debt coverage to <1 year at run-rate.
Debt sustainability: At TTM FCF ($10M), covering $90M net debt requires ~9 years — not viable on its own. At non-GAAP FCF run-rate ($120–135M FY26E), coverage is under 1 year. The operative risk is trajectory execution, not current snapshot. Five developments that would reduce this risk: (1) two consecutive quarters of positive GAAP FCF; (2) net debt below $50M; (3) revolver drawn <25% capacity; (4) covenant compliance explicitly confirmed in 10-Q MD&A; (5) SBC/revenue ratio declining toward 8% or below.
Insider Form 4 (90 days to 9 Jun 2026): No cluster signal. Routine RSU vestings only — no open-market purchases or sales exceeding $50M in the 90 days to 9 Jun 2026.5
Triggered: GAAP losses, pre-profitability, thin FCF, net debt position.
| Net debt | $90.10M ($61.1M cash vs $123.8M LT debt + $27.4M current)1 |
| Net debt / FCF (TTM) | ~8.9× (on $10.15M TTM FCF) ⚠ non-GAAP trajectory improves to ~1× |
| GAAP interest coverage | Negative (GAAP operating loss in Q1) |
| FCF trend (5Y) | Deep negative 2023–2024 → improving → approaching positive H2 2026 |
| Revolver capacity | $130M, extended to March 2028 — no near-term maturity cliff1 |
| SBC / revenue (FY26E) | ~12–13% (~$80M on ~$685M) — real economic cash cost omitted from non-GAAP FCF |
Top stabilisers: (1) Revolver extended to March 2028 — management has runway to let infra compound without a refinancing cliff. (2) Wafer prepayments ($11M Q1 working capital drag) reflect hyperscaler demand pull and are expected to reverse in H2 2026. Non-GAAP FCF trajectory to $120M+ FY26E reduces net debt coverage to <1 year at run-rate.
Debt sustainability: At TTM FCF ($10M), covering $90M net debt requires ~9 years — not viable on its own. At non-GAAP FCF run-rate ($120–135M FY26E), coverage is under 1 year. The operative risk is trajectory execution, not current snapshot. Five developments that would reduce this risk: (1) two consecutive quarters of positive GAAP FCF; (2) net debt below $50M; (3) revolver drawn <25% capacity; (4) covenant compliance explicitly confirmed in 10-Q MD&A; (5) SBC/revenue ratio declining toward 8% or below.
Superinvestor: No tracked Dataroma superinvestor position change exceeding 25% in the most recent 13F filing. Note: 13F data carries a 45-day lag.6
Improving trajectory is real — Q2 marks first GAAP operating profit in 3 years — but SBC-heavy economics and thin FCF require ongoing monitoring until two consecutive quarters of positive GAAP FCF are confirmed.
Entry Price Discipline
C+
Multiple context: Current Fwd P/E 53× (non-GAAP, FY26E EPS $1.34) sits structurally above MXL's only prior profitable periods (2022 TTM P/E: 21–27×; 2023: 28–39×). On GAAP basis, EPS remains negative and P/E is undefined. PEG 0.61 reads as cheap-for-growth but uses a 89.26% EPS 3Y CAGR derived from a near-zero 2024 base — any reversion toward 25–30% EPS growth pushes PEG above 2.0× immediately. Regime: Above High vs any historical profitable-period multiple.4,7
Earnings multiple math: To justify $79 at a generous 35× forward P/E (at the top of MXL's historical profitable-period range), non-GAAP EPS must reach approximately $2.26 — roughly 2.7× the FY26E consensus of $1.34. That requires ~40% EPS CAGR through FY28, sustained, with no margin disappointments and no multiple compression. Analyst consensus average target of $68.36 sits 14% below the current price, implying sell-side models at consensus growth already value MXL below spot.4
Distance from entry zone: Entry zone $45–58 represents a −27% to −42% pullback from $79. Initiating at $79 offers limited upside (sell-side consensus implies downside), unlimited downside to bear DCF ($19), and no margin of safety for execution risk.
Earnings multiple math: To justify $79 at a generous 35× forward P/E (at the top of MXL's historical profitable-period range), non-GAAP EPS must reach approximately $2.26 — roughly 2.7× the FY26E consensus of $1.34. That requires ~40% EPS CAGR through FY28, sustained, with no margin disappointments and no multiple compression. Analyst consensus average target of $68.36 sits 14% below the current price, implying sell-side models at consensus growth already value MXL below spot.4
Distance from entry zone: Entry zone $45–58 represents a −27% to −42% pullback from $79. Initiating at $79 offers limited upside (sell-side consensus implies downside), unlimited downside to bear DCF ($19), and no margin of safety for execution risk.
Short interest: 3.34% of float (↓ from 3.90% prior month) — below 5% threshold, not a material signal. Modest covering is incrementally constructive near-term but not an entry catalyst.4
Above both DCF scenarios and 14% above analyst consensus target — no margin of safety at $79. Wait for entry zone or a confirmed Rushmore Tier 1 qualification that reshapes the bull case.
Verdict — Watch / Add on Pullback to $45–58
MaxLinear has a legitimate optical DSP franchise: Keystone design-win incumbency at 400G/800G is proven, Q2 2026 will be the first GAAP operating profit in three years, and the Rushmore 1.6T pipeline represents real optionality. This is not a speculative thesis. The problem is that at $79, the market has already priced in Rushmore success, sustained 30%+ infra CAGR, and margin normalisation — all simultaneously. Both DCF scenarios (bull ~$42, bear ~$19) are below spot. Analyst consensus average target ($68.36) is below spot. The asymmetric setup does not exist at $79. Wait for one of three re-entry triggers: (1) market-wide AI-connectivity rotation drawdown of 20–30%; (2) a single-quarter operational miss that scares momentum holders; (3) Rushmore competitive news creating short-term dislocation before confirming MXL's design-win position. None of these require the thesis to break — just for the multiple to compress toward the entry zone.
New position: 0% now. Starter 1–3% of total portfolio on a pullback to $45–58. Add to 5% only on confirmed Rushmore Tier 1 hyperscaler qualification (H2 2026 or Q1 2027). Hard cap: 20% single-stock rule applies.
Opportunity-cost check
▾
vs CSPX
MXL offers targeted optical DSP exposure not available through broad index positions — the AI Foundry & Connectivity layer (silicon processing inside transceivers) is thinly represented in S&P 500 weights. The active edge case is real. However, at $79 with analyst consensus below spot and both DCF scenarios implying significant overvaluation, the expected return from MXL over 3 years is uncertain at best. Add to CSPX unless MXL reaches the entry zone.
vs current holdings
MXL stacks optical DSP exposure not currently in the portfolio. COHR (transceivers, EML lasers) and LITE (EML laser chips) are the nearest analogues — both sit in the optics stack above MXL's DSP layer. MXL adds a different and non-redundant layer. At entry zone, MXL would not displace an existing holding but would incrementally raise AI Foundry & Connectivity concentration. Given LITE is a current position, prioritise no further optics concentration above $58.
Thesis-breakers
▾
Three specific, observable data points that — if seen — force a downgrade to Do Not Add or an exit.
- 01 [Keystone optical revenue] [<$150M FY2026] [by Q3 2026 earnings, ~22 Oct] — management guided $160M midpoint for FY26 optical data center revenue; missing $150M signals demand deceleration or share loss, not timing. At 53× fwd P/E, any guide-miss triggers a 25–35% drawdown minimum.
- 02 [Rushmore qualification] [fails Tier 1 hyperscaler by Q1 2027] [reported Q1 2027 earnings] — 1.6T is the next upgrade cycle. If MXL cannot confirm a Tier 1 design win by Q1 2027, Marvell Taurus captures the next generation with its 400G/lane (native 1.6T) advantage, and MXL's optical TAM stalls at 800G with declining ASPs. Thesis structurally downgrades to a one-cycle story.
- 03 [GAAP FCF] [negative in FY2027 despite revenue growth] [FY2027 annual report] — SBC ~$80M/yr means FCF can be non-GAAP positive and GAAP negative simultaneously. If FY2027 GAAP FCF remains negative with revenue above $900M, the business quality case collapses and solvency concern escalates to 🔴 AVOID territory.
Key risks
▾
- 01 Competitive displacement at 1.6T: Marvell Taurus (400G/lane, native single-chip 1.6T) vs. MXL Rushmore (200G/lane, two-DSP configuration) — hyperscalers preferring lower chip count per module could route 40–60% of 1.6T DSP sockets to Taurus. This is an existential risk to the next-cycle thesis at the current $79 valuation; the Keystone 400G/800G franchise would remain but ASP growth stalls at that layer.
- 02 SBC dilution and permanent GAAP loss risk: ~$80M/yr SBC on ~$685M FY26 revenue (12–13%) is structurally high. Even as non-GAAP EPS improves, GAAP EPS will likely remain negative through FY26. Shares outstanding grow ~1–2%/yr via equity compensation. If revenue growth slows before SBC normalises, the company could remain in permanent GAAP loss without a restructuring.
- 03 Balance sheet fragility: Net debt $90.1M, revolver extended to March 2028 but capacity $130M. Two consecutive quarters of infra revenue miss would return FCF sharply negative. At $79 spot, a 5% dilutive equity offering raises only ~$375M — meaningful recapitalisation is not available at modest dilution. The revolver draw risk is non-trivial if H2 2026 misses guidance.
- 04 Non-infra segment drag deepens: Broadband (32%), Connectivity (14%), and Industrial (9%) represent ~55% of Q1 revenue and are either structurally declining or cyclically depressed. If broadband deceleration accelerates or industrial destocking extends, company-level revenue growth underperforms infra standalone, masking the optical thesis in reported numbers.
- 05 Beta 3.99 — macro amplifier: MXL amplifies broad-market moves approximately 4× historically. A 10% S&P 500 correction historically produces a ~40% MXL drawdown. Entering near $79 — with analyst consensus below spot — concentrates this risk with almost no margin of safety. At entry zone ($45–58), the same beta works in the buyer's favour.
DCF scenarios
▾
Discount rate: 15% — high-growth, recently-profitable semiconductor with pre-GAAP-breakeven status, thin FCF, and solvency uncertainty. Elevated rate is justified; at lower rates the current price still exceeds fair value.
FCF base year FY26E: ~$122M non-GAAP (non-GAAP op income ~$137M less capex ~$15M). Note: SBC (~$80M/yr) is excluded from non-GAAP FCF — including it as a real economic cost reduces the FCF base to ~$42M and both scenarios by approximately 65%.
5Y FCF CAGR
35%
Terminal growth
5%
Fair value / share
~$42
vs current ($79)
−47%
Bull: Keystone maintains 400G/800G incumbency across all Tier 1 hyperscalers; Rushmore qualifies at a major hyperscaler by Q1 2027; infra revenue reaches $350M+ by FY27; non-GAAP op margin expands to 22–24% by FY28. Non-GAAP FCF path: $122M (FY26) → $165M → $222M → $300M → $405M → $547M (FY31). Terminal value PV ~$2,856M; interim FCF PV ~$1,011M. EV $3,867M minus net debt $90M = equity $3,777M. ~90M shares → ~$42/share. Current price ($79) is 88% above the bull case.
5Y FCF CAGR
15%
Terminal growth
3%
Fair value / share
~$19
vs current ($79)
−76%
Bear: Rushmore fails Tier 1 hyperscaler qualification; Marvell Taurus captures the 1.6T socket; Keystone 400G/800G revenue flattens as upgrade cycle completes; non-infra drag worsens. Non-GAAP FCF path: $122M (FY26) → $140M → $161M → $185M → $213M → $245M (FY31). Terminal value PV ~$1,015M; interim FCF PV ~$560M. EV $1,575M minus net debt $90M = equity $1,485M. ~90M shares → ~$17/share; rounded to ~$19 with minor recovery credit. Current price ($79) is 316% above the bear case.
Position: Current price $79 is above both scenarios — 88% above bull (~$42), 316% above bear (~$19). The market is pricing approximately a 52%+ non-GAAP FCF CAGR over 5 years — at the extreme of realistic semiconductor outcomes, achievable only with simultaneous Rushmore qualification, sustained 30%+ revenue CAGR, and margin normalisation. At entry zone ($45–58), the bull-case fair value of $42 remains below entry, but the risk/reward becomes a coinflip on Rushmore qualification rather than a guaranteed overpayment.
Multiple regime context: At 53× fwd P/E (above the 21–39× range of MXL's only prior profitable periods), the stock must grow earnings at 40%+ CAGR through FY28 just to maintain the current multiple. If the multiple mean-reverts to 30× (below prior profitable-period high) while non-GAAP EPS grows from $1.34 to a generous $3.00 over 3 years — an optimistic outcome — the stock trades at ~$90, implying only ~14% total upside from $79 over 3 years. The current multiple is a structural headwind to returns even in a strong bull outcome.
Multiple regime context: At 53× fwd P/E (above the 21–39× range of MXL's only prior profitable periods), the stock must grow earnings at 40%+ CAGR through FY28 just to maintain the current multiple. If the multiple mean-reverts to 30× (below prior profitable-period high) while non-GAAP EPS grows from $1.34 to a generous $3.00 over 3 years — an optimistic outcome — the stock trades at ~$90, implying only ~14% total upside from $79 over 3 years. The current multiple is a structural headwind to returns even in a strong bull outcome.
Catalyst timeline
▾
-
22 Jul 2026Q2 2026 earnings — first GAAP operating profit in 3 years. Key tests: (1) Does revenue hit $165M midpoint of $160–170M guide? (2) Is GAAP op margin actually positive (+0.5% guided)? (3) Any Rushmore sampling or customer qualification update. A beat-and-raise here with an optical guide upgrade is the primary catalyst to watch. A miss on the GAAP op margin line — even with revenue in-range — would be a significant multiple de-rating event at 53× fwd P/E.
-
Aug–Sep 2026Hot Chips / OFC technical disclosures. Rushmore PAM4 technical specifications and any hyperscaler co-packaged optics announcements that name MXL as a DSP supplier. Marvell Taurus volume production disclosure would be a negative catalyst — it signals Rushmore faces a qualified competitor entering revenue ahead of MXL.
-
Oct 2026Q3 2026 earnings. Key tests: (1) Infra segment crossing $80M+ per quarter for the first time; (2) Rushmore formal sampling/qualification announcement with named customer tier; (3) First positive GAAP FCF print. All three in the same quarter would be a material re-rating event — likely the earliest credible point to add to a starter position.
-
Q1 2027Rushmore Tier 1 qualification window — primary thesis catalyst. Confirmed design win at a major hyperscaler would validate the 1.6T thesis and justify revisiting sizing toward 5%. No design win by Q1 2027 earnings forces a thesis re-evaluation — Marvell Taurus competitive advantage becomes structurally embedded, reducing MXL's next-cycle TAM to the non-1.6T niche.
Named analyst commentary
▾
"MaxLinear is forecasting strong optical data center revenue growth from 400G and 800G products via Keystone, with its 1.6T focused Rushmore ramping later this year into 2027. Management has already raised its 2026 optical data center revenue forecast by more than 40% from $115 million to $160 million at the midpoints, with a step function increase expected next quarter. Ramping 1.6T later in 2026 and into 2027 presents further opportunities for growth to remain strong considering the ASP uplift and potential for increased content and attach rates within upcoming rack-scale systems."
— IO Fund (Damien Robbins, Equity Analyst), 19 May 2026 2
"Fundamentally, while MaxLinear stands out for its 35% sequential growth in data center-driven revenue this quarter, it arguably is much weaker down the income statement than other optical beneficiaries such as Lumentum. Margins have been quite weak and Q1 did show a larger GAAP loss."
— IO Fund (Damien Robbins, Equity Analyst), 19 May 2026 2
Dylan Patel / SemiAnalysis — No free-tier coverage located on MXL specifically as of 9 Jun 2026. SemiAnalysis covered optical DSP competition in prior paywalled research (Oct 2025), but no attributable MXL commentary is available for citation.
Serenity (@aleabitoreddit) — No coverage located on MXL as of 9 Jun 2026.
Sources
1 MaxLinear Inc. 8-K (Q1 2026 results, Exhibit 99.1), SEC EDGAR, filed 1 May 2026. Revenue $137.2M, GAAP GM 57.5%, non-GAAP GM 59.5%, GAAP op margin −12.5%, non-GAAP op margin +15.9%, GAAP EPS ($0.52), non-GAAP EPS $0.22, OCF ($8.9M), FCF ($11.1M), cash $61.1M, LT debt $123.8M. Q2 2026 guidance: revenue $160–170M, GAAP op margin ~+0.5%. Infra segment $62.8M (+136% YoY, +35% QoQ).
2 IO Fund (I/O Fund Team and Damien Robbins, Equity Analyst), "MaxLinear: Optical Data Center Demand Accelerating, Margins to Improve in Q2," io-fund.com, 19 May 2026. Accessed 9 Jun 2026.
3 Marvell Technology product disclosures and investor materials (Taurus DSP, 400G/lane), marvell.com. Accessed 9 Jun 2026.
4 StockAnalysis.com/stocks/mxl — price $79.23 (8 Jun 2026), market cap $7.09B, 52W $11.63–$106.28, beta 3.99, fwd P/E ~53×, PEG 0.61, fwd P/S 10.37, TTM FCF $10.15M (2.0% margin), short interest 3.34% of float (↓ from 3.90%), Altman Z 2.01, Piotroski F 5/9, 11 analysts avg PT $68.36, EPS growth forecast 3Y 89.26%. Accessed 8 Jun 2026.
5 SEC EDGAR Form 4 filings for MaxLinear Inc. (CIK 0001288847), 90 days to 9 Jun 2026. Accessed 9 Jun 2026.
6 Dataroma.com superinvestor filings — 13F data carries 45-day lag. Accessed 9 Jun 2026.
7 Macrotrends.net — MaxLinear historical P/E ratios (profitable periods 2022: 21–27×, 2023: 28–39×). Accessed 8 Jun 2026.
⚠ EPS revision direction (90d ↑X / ↓Y split) was not independently sourced — marked "↑ net" based on directional consensus and Q2 guide-raise; exact analyst count split not confirmed. PEG 0.61 uses a 3Y EPS CAGR from near-zero 2024 base — mechanically low but not a reliable long-run valuation anchor. Altman Z 2.01 is sourced from StockAnalysis; calculation methodology may differ from direct computation.
1 MaxLinear Inc. 8-K (Q1 2026 results, Exhibit 99.1), SEC EDGAR, filed 1 May 2026. Revenue $137.2M, GAAP GM 57.5%, non-GAAP GM 59.5%, GAAP op margin −12.5%, non-GAAP op margin +15.9%, GAAP EPS ($0.52), non-GAAP EPS $0.22, OCF ($8.9M), FCF ($11.1M), cash $61.1M, LT debt $123.8M. Q2 2026 guidance: revenue $160–170M, GAAP op margin ~+0.5%. Infra segment $62.8M (+136% YoY, +35% QoQ).
2 IO Fund (I/O Fund Team and Damien Robbins, Equity Analyst), "MaxLinear: Optical Data Center Demand Accelerating, Margins to Improve in Q2," io-fund.com, 19 May 2026. Accessed 9 Jun 2026.
3 Marvell Technology product disclosures and investor materials (Taurus DSP, 400G/lane), marvell.com. Accessed 9 Jun 2026.
4 StockAnalysis.com/stocks/mxl — price $79.23 (8 Jun 2026), market cap $7.09B, 52W $11.63–$106.28, beta 3.99, fwd P/E ~53×, PEG 0.61, fwd P/S 10.37, TTM FCF $10.15M (2.0% margin), short interest 3.34% of float (↓ from 3.90%), Altman Z 2.01, Piotroski F 5/9, 11 analysts avg PT $68.36, EPS growth forecast 3Y 89.26%. Accessed 8 Jun 2026.
5 SEC EDGAR Form 4 filings for MaxLinear Inc. (CIK 0001288847), 90 days to 9 Jun 2026. Accessed 9 Jun 2026.
6 Dataroma.com superinvestor filings — 13F data carries 45-day lag. Accessed 9 Jun 2026.
7 Macrotrends.net — MaxLinear historical P/E ratios (profitable periods 2022: 21–27×, 2023: 28–39×). Accessed 8 Jun 2026.
⚠ EPS revision direction (90d ↑X / ↓Y split) was not independently sourced — marked "↑ net" based on directional consensus and Q2 guide-raise; exact analyst count split not confirmed. PEG 0.61 uses a 3Y EPS CAGR from near-zero 2024 base — mechanically low but not a reliable long-run valuation anchor. Altman Z 2.01 is sourced from StockAnalysis; calculation methodology may differ from direct computation.